The world’s naval encyclopedia, while giving an account of the Indian flotilla’s chronological development predicted that “by the early 1990s the Indian fleet will most likely include two aircraft carriers, three Kresta class cruisers, nine destroyers nine large and ten small frigates, 14 missile corvettes, 14 missile craft a considerable Coast Guard force, a useful naval air arm as well as bases and dockyards disposed all around the coasts and in the Nicobar Islands”.
The naval pundits and fortune tellers of the mid 1980s while criticizing the Indian establishment also virtually challenged the maritime build up of New Delhi thus “This is not the inventory of a country whose only purpose is to remain at peace in a peaceful ocean. It is far more the fleet of a country determined to establish a maritime hegemony amongst much weaker neighbours”. The implication is obvious.

India in the 1980 was a suspected, untrustworthy bully. Its rising navy was unacceptable to the West owing to New Delhi’s excessive dependence on Moscow in an era of cold war with all round suspicion and potentially aggressive posture. In fact at one stage it was even suggested by the traditional naval powers of the West that India could join forces with the Soviet naval squadron to keep other foreign fleets at bay in a period of crisis thereby New Delhi to achieve its goal of a local super – power status in the northern periphery of the Indian Ocean.

In this context, if one turns the pages of naval history of India down to the Indo-Pak war of 1971, one would, however, shudder to contemplate as to what could have happened if Pakistan had taken slight care and made some calculation to up-grade her sea-denial capability! The fleet of New Delhi consisted of old, obsolete and overused vessels averaging between 28 and 38 years of Second World War vintage. The former “Colony” class cruiser Mysore’s age was 31 years and the ex-“Leander” class light cruiser Delhi had completed 38 years on the sea. Similarly, all three ex-“Hunt” class escort destroyers were aged between 27 and 30 years in December, 1971. In brief, except for the four “Foxtrot” class submarines of USSR origin, which were first inducted into the fleet in July, 1968, the surface combatants of the Indian flotilla were old British vessels thereby making the operational capability thereof extremely limited.

Thus as India in the early seventies had nowhere to go for ships, she perforce turned to the ex-USSR for fleet acquisition, modernization and maintenance. Nevertheless the turnaround of the Navy of New Delhi did not go unnoticed as was reflected in the 1979-1980 assessment of the world almanac of fighting ships, called “Jane’s” thus:- “India, meanwhile, is building a solid, competent naval force. Destroyers, frigates, minesweepers and amphibious craft from the USSR are melded with British-designed ‘Leanders’ and will, in the future, join Indian built frigated and submarines. There is little doubt that new ships will follow the old Vikrant and the Indian Navy is set for maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean”.

Fortunately, the momentum of Indian establishment’s intention and enthusiasm, determination and action on the naval front continued unabated, occasional hiccups notwithstanding. In fact, of all the wings of the Indian armed forces, the expansion and execution of New Delhi’s naval acquisition plan and the modernization and upgrading thereof have been most spectacular and impressive. So much so that at the beginning of 1990s the fresh international analysis of the rationale behind India’s naval expansion gathered momentum. It was noted that the “facts are not in dispute but the motives are more complicated.” It was pointed out that whereas the Indian Navy got six percent of the defence budget in the 1970s, which rose to twelve percent in 1989-1990, it could possibly “break the 20 percent mark by the end of the 20th century.”

Next