Since Tenton, as reported, is the biggest Indian defence deal with the USA in recent times, it may be interesting to explore the actual role, deployment and interfacing thereof with the rest of the Indian sea force which till date did not have a single US machine in its inventory.

With a full load 17000 displacement tons, 7700 miles range at a maximum speed of 21 knots, complement of 420men (both sailors and officers), four guns (of different caliber), countermeasures, electronic support measure, combat data systems and radars, Trenton’s strength lies in its extended capability to make its presence felt in an out of area operations by its on-board helicopters; which according to Jane’s Fighting Ships is – “Upto 6 Ch.46D/E Sea Knights” and that a “typical operational load might include one Seahawk, two Sea Knight, two Twin Huey, four Sea Cobra helicopters”.

Critics and cynics may question the wisdom of going for a ship manufactured in 1971. The counter-point, however, would be: is it something new? Did not India purchase the 1940s manufactured Royal Navy ship INS Vikrant in 1960s? Did not India go for 1959 manufactured INS Viraat in 1987? Has not the Indian Navy sought and bought the “Modified Kiev class” aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov commissioned on January 11,1987? A ship which will take at least two more years to be operated by the Indian fleet after its refit and upgradation in Severodvinsk ? In all these cases, referred to above, the Indian acquisition revolved round the offensive capability of “sea control” platform. In the present scenario, however, the role of Trenton appears to be in a “sea denial” mode while acting solo, and a part of “sea control” armada’s logistics and support ship in a fleet operation. Why? Just see the class under which it falls “amphibious transport docks”.

Seen from another angle, it is transparently clear that the USA today would no longer like to go all alone and all out in areas far away from its shore. Understandably, US Navy prefers co-operation in the vulnerable sea lanes of Asia and the Middle East as anti-terror war serves as a great leveler to all those whose oil come from, and through, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

It is thus obvious that the purchase of Trenton matches the long term maritime vision of both India and the USA to accomplish an oceanic vision. As the regional power, India’s interest lies around the Indian Ocean and as the global power US Navy needs to coordinate with the navies of the volatile regions of oil route.

Thus the answer to the critics and cynics lies in realpolitik and “real” hardware availability. What India required was not readily available in the market. Russia or UK, France or Germany, Japan or Italy, none could have met the Indian requirement and none had any surplus to spare. Only USA had the ship and could provide one from its Atlantic fleet

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